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  1513 
THE FACE-OFF BETWEEN DATA PRIVACY 
AND DISCOVERY: WHY U.S. COURTS 
SHOULD RESPECT EU DATA PRIVACY LAW 
WHEN CONSIDERING THE PRODUCTION 
OF PROTECTED INFORMATION 
Abstract: When foreign parties involved in U.S. litigation are ordered to pro-
duce information that is protected by EU data privacy law, they are caught in an 
unfortunate “Catch-22.” Historically, U.S. courts have pointed to the unlikeli-
hood of sanctions for data privacy law violations to justify these orders. EU data 
privacy law, however, has recently undergone several shifts in favor of tougher 
rules and significantly increased sanctions. Additionally, EU regulators are now 
more vigilant and active in enforcing these laws. These developments, com-
bined with the benefits of international judicial respect and the intrinsic value of 
privacy, mean that U.S. courts should more strongly consider EU data privacy 
law in discovery deliberations. This Note argues that courts should more heavily 
weigh the interests of foreign nations and the hardship on foreign litigants when 
contemplating discovery orders and, when appropriate, order discovery to be 
conducted through the Hague Evidence Convention rather than by the foreign 
party. 
INTRODUCTION 
As technology develops and more information is stored and accessible 
online, the risks regarding the security of that information increase, requiring 
the law to keep up.1 In recent years, several major shifts have occurred in EU 
data privacy law that affect companies in the United States and around the 
world.2 These changes have occurred in tandem with an increased EU vigi-
lance for data privacy and for pursuing those who threaten it.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON PRIVACY AND INFOR-
MATION SECURITY: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR LAWYERS, LAW FIRMS, AND OTHER LEGAL SERVICE 
PROVIDERS 11 (2015), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Sedona_Privacy_InfoSec_Law-firms.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CY5L-VFDE] (observing that data privacy laws have developed in response 
to massive data breaches); Morgan A. Corley, The Need for an International Convention on Data 
Privacy: Taking a Cue from the CISG, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 721, 721–22 (2016) (noting that tech-
nological advances and the increased movement of personal information has resulted in a rise in data 
breaches); Protection of Personal Data, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-
cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/know-your-rights/freedoms/protection-personal-
data_en [https://perma.cc/57JG-F3BG] (pointing out that individuals entrust their personal infor-
mation to third parties for everyday actions). 
 2 See McKay Cunningham, Complying with International Data Protection Law, 84 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 421, 421 (2016) (explaining how businesses with even negligible foreign relationships may 
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In U.S. litigation, discovery orders often run up against data privacy 
laws.4 Foreign litigants can find themselves in a quandary when they are 
ordered to produce information that is protected by foreign data privacy 
laws.5 U.S. courts have frequently dismissed the consequences of ordering 
litigants to violate EU data privacy laws by pointing to the unlikelihood of 
their enforcement.6 
This Note discusses the increasing importance of EU data privacy law 
in discovery deliberations.7 Part I provides a brief history of EU data priva-
cy law, including the development of more stringent rules and sanctions.8 It 
then highlights the recent increase in EU enforcement actions for data pri-
vacy violations.9 Part II discusses the conflict between EU data privacy law 
and U.S. discovery procedures.10 Part III argues that U.S. courts should ad-
just their approach to discovery orders that contravene EU data privacy law 
by more strongly considering the hardship placed on foreign litigants, as 
well as the intrinsic value of privacy.11 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DATA PRIVACY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Data privacy law governs the collection, use, processing, preservation, 
and divulgence of personal information.12 Personal information is defined 
broadly, so data privacy law applies to most U.S. businesses.13 Rather than a 
                                                                                                                           
be subjected to or impacted by foreign data privacy law); Sam Schechner, Ireland’s Privacy Cop 
Picks Up the Beat: Irish Data-Protection Chief Helen Dixon Sets Pace for EU Monitoring of 
Global Tech Giants, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/irelands-
privacy-cop-picks-up-the-beat-1482855575 [https://perma.cc/XTC7-QA27] [hereinafter Schech-
ner, Ireland’s Privacy Cop] (quoting Irish Data Privacy Commissioner Helen Dixon who said that 
EU data privacy laws will serve as a benchmark for the rest of the world). 
 3 See infra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
 4 SEDONA CONFERENCE, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON DISCOVERY, DISCLOSURE & DATA 
PROTECTION: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING THE PRESER-
VATION DISCOVERY OF PROTECTED DATA IN U.S. LITIGATION 2 (Amor A. Esteban ed., 2011), 
https://theedonaconference.org/system/files/sites/sedona.civicactions.net/files/private/drupal/filesys/
publications/International%20Litigation%20Principles_Transitional%20Ed_Jan%202017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SUL4-7PV8] [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON DISCOVERY]. 
 5 Steven C. Bennett, EU Privacy Shield: Practical Implications for U.S. Litigation, 62 PRAC. 
L. 60, 60 (2016). 
 6 Id. at 63. 
 7 See infra notes 12–188 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 12–65 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 85–142 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 143–169 and accompanying text. 
 12 Brian M. Gaff et al., Privacy and Data Security, 2012 COMPUTER 9, 9, http://www.edwards
wildman.com/files/upload/March%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB4N-N3ZD]. 
 13 Id.; 101: Data Protection, PRIVACY INT’L, https://privacyinternational.org/explainer/41/
101-data-protection [https://perma.cc/8H37-E28Q]. Personal information includes any type of in-
formation that can be used to identify someone. Gaff et al., supra note 12. It can encompass simple 
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single law, a continually broadening assemblage of statutes, regulations, 
common law duties, contractual commitments, industry norms, and interna-
tional obligations govern U.S. data privacy practices.14 Agreements between 
the United States and the European Union are an important source of data 
privacy law.15 
Despite differing approaches to protecting personal information, the 
United States and the European Union have deliberately and continuously 
endeavored to cooperate with one another.16 As an economic region with 
significant market power and a hub for U.S. trade and investment, the Eu-
ropean Union has substantial negotiating power on data privacy matters.17 
U.S. businesses with operations in the European Union rely on EU-U.S. 
information exchanges, so any possible limitations on those exchanges are 
highly consequential.18 
Despite the European Union’s strong position, the United States per-
sists as a powerful adversary at the negotiating table because the U.S. econ-
omy is the largest international arena for EU companies.19 Both the United 
States and the European Union had good reason to negotiate a solution to 
                                                                                                                           
data like names, birth dates, and contact information, or more obscure data like financial or health 
information, fingerprints, license plate numbers, or Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses. 101: Data 
Protection, supra. A person can be “identified”—even if a data collector does not know his or her 
name—by singling them out, tracking their activity, and creating a detailed profile. Id. 
 14 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES ISSUED 
BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE II, https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.File
Download?file=015t00000004qAg [https://perma.cc/93XY-ZV8Q] [hereinafter PRIVACY SHIELD] 
(governing data transfers from the European Union to the United States); Gaff et al., supra note 
12, at 9–10 (explaining that U.S. federal data privacy law specifically regulates the financial and 
healthcare sectors, but various other laws require the provision of data security for personal infor-
mation in all areas of business); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6802 (2012) (imposing a duty on 
financial institutions to safeguard their clients’ private personal information and governing the 
disclosure of such information); 210 MASS CODE REGS. 17.03 (2018) (requiring every data pro-
cessor in possession of personal information regarding a Massachusetts resident to facilitate a 
complete data privacy security system). 
 15 See infra notes 28–52 and accompanying text (explaining the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles (“Safe Harbor”) and the subsequent EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (“Privacy Shield”)). 
 16 Corley, supra note 1, at 726. 
 17 Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International 
Rules in the Ratcheting up of U.S. Data Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 39 (2000). The 
European Union is the United States’ largest trading partner and the locus of most international 
investment and overseas production by U.S. businesses. Id. Additionally, EU member states sig-
nificantly increased their bargaining power relative to the United States when they shifted their 
negotiating power for international data privacy issues to the European Commission. Id. at 41. 
Because the EU member states decided to act together, the impact of a EU data transfer ban be-
came much more serious and led the United States to act more cautiously than it might have 
against individual member states. Id. 
 18 Id. at 41. U.S. companies rely on information exchanges with many outside entities such as 
suppliers, clients, advisers, and advertisers, as well as their internal associates, branches, and sub-
sidiaries. Id. 
 19 Id. at 41, 44. 
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their dispute regarding the adequacy of data privacy protections.20 Conse-
quently, from 1998 to 2000, officials engaged in negotiations to construct a 
legal framework by which U.S. entities could satisfy the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive’s (“EU Directive”) standards.21 
This Part explores the evolution of EU data privacy law.22 Section A 
provides a summary of the EU Directive and the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Priva-
cy Principles (“Safe Harbor”) framework.23 Section B explains the impact of 
Schrems v. Irish Data Protection Commissioner on the data privacy law land-
scape.24 Section C describes the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (“Privacy Shield”) 
framework.25 Section D highlights some of the changes the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (“GDPR”) will bring.26 Section E highlights examples of 
the recent increase in EU enforcement actions for data privacy violations.27 
A. Safe Harbor: A Solution to the EU Directive 
The EU legislature issued the EU Directive in 1995.28 The EU Di-
rective governs data movement into and out of the European Union.29 It 
also forbids transfers of personal information to non-EU countries unless 
the country guarantees an “adequate level of protection.”30 
The European Union found that the United States did not provide “ade-
quate” data privacy protection for EU citizens and prohibited personal data 
transfers to the United States.31 In 2000, the United States and the European 
Union agreed to Safe Harbor, which the European Commission deemed com-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See id. at 44–45 (explaining how economic interests persuaded the U.S. and EU govern-
ments to solve their data privacy disagreement). 
 21 See Bennett, supra note 5, at 61 (indicating that the Safe Harbor agreement was brokered 
from 1998 to 2000); Corley, supra note 1, at 747 (explaining that, faced with the limitations of the 
EU Data Protection Directive (“EU Directive”), EU and U.S. representatives started to discuss a 
solution). 
 22 See infra notes 28–84 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 28–34 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 43–51 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 51–65 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
 28 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 50 [hereinafter EU Directive]. A directive is one 
of the four types of EU legislation and is a law adopted by the EU legislature, setting a certain 
policy goal, but allowing member states to devise their own means of achieving it. DIRECTORATE-
GEN. FOR COMMC’N, EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPLAINED: HOW THE EU 
WORKS 5 (2014). 
 29 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, European Union and United States Con-
clude Agreement to Regulate Transatlantic Personal Data Transfers, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 360, 361 
(2016). 
 30 EU Directive, supra note 28, at 45. 
 31 Bennett, supra note 5, at 61. 
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pliant with the EU Directive’s requirements.32 Safe Harbor embodied seven 
core principles for U.S. organizations to adhere to in their data privacy prac-
tices: notice, choice, onward transfer, access, security, data integrity, and en-
forcement.33 Under Safe Harbor, businesses voluntarily chose to enact certain 
data protection safeguards and they self-certified compliance with the core 
principles.34 
B. The Schrems Decision’s Pivotal Impact on Data Privacy 
In October 2015, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) found Safe 
Harbor invalid in Schrems because it did not ensure adequate protection for 
EU personal data.35 The ECJ interpreted “adequate level of protection” un-
der the EU Directive as a degree of security for basic rights and liberties 
that is substantially similar to the protection guaranteed within the European 
Union.36 In finding Safe Harbor inadequate, the ECJ largely concentrated 
on the absence of legal remedies available to EU citizens to vindicate their 
basic rights to privacy under Safe Harbor.37 The court further observed the 
deficiency of enforcement methods and liability under Safe Harbor, largely 
because U.S. entities self-certified their compliance.38 
Following Schrems, the EU Data Protection Authorities (“DPAs”) de-
clared that organizations could no longer rely on Safe Harbor to conduct 
EU-U.S. data transfers.39 Consequently, all U.S. organizations that engaged 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 8; U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles, EXPORT.GOV (July 21, 2000), https://build.export.gov/main/safeharbor/
eu/eg_main_018475 [https://perma.cc/DUC8-MK8E]; see Bennett, supra note 5, at 61 (stating that 
Safe Harbor was negotiated from 1998 to 2000). 
 33 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://2016.export.
gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp [https://perma.cc/LX65-SHQ4]. 
 34 Bennett, supra note 5, at 61; see Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU 
Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, at 2, COM (2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013) (ex-
plaining that Safe Harbor is structured so that organizations voluntarily self-certify their compli-
ance with its principles, but those who volunteer to do so are bound by the agreement). 
 35 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650, 25; Lisa 
Mays, The Trickle Down Effect of Privacy Shield Uncertainty: Fluctuating Lines for Anti-Bribery 
Compliance, 19 J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2016). 
 36 Schrems, 2015 E.C.R at 21. The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) noted that a third-party 
country cannot be required to ensure an “identical” level of protection to the European Union, but 
merely an “adequate” level of protection. Id. 
 37 Bennett, supra note 5, at 61; see Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. at 24 (noting that the European 
Commission acknowledged that under Safe Harbor, people did not have access to any redress 
methods that would allow them to obtain, change, or delete their personal information). 
 38 Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. at 22–23; Bennett, supra note 5, at 61. 
 39 Bennett, supra note 5, at 61; ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, STATEMENT OF THE ARTICLE 
29 WORKING PARTY (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
sites/18/2015/10/20151016_wp29_statement_on_schrems_judgement-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NXZ-
YHWZ]. The Article 29 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Pro-
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in data transfers with the European Union could no longer self-certify under 
Safe Harbor.40 In order to continue transferring data across the Atlantic, 
these organizations had to take additional steps to separately validate that 
they protected personal information adequately under the EU Directive.41 
C. The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: The New and Improved Safe Harbor 
The European Commission officially approved Privacy Shield as Safe 
Harbor’s replacement on July 16, 2016.42 Privacy Shield preserved many of 
Safe Harbor’s principles.43 However, Privacy Shield requires more trans-
parency than Safe Harbor and institutes supervision methods to guarantee 
ongoing compliance.44 
                                                                                                                           
cessing of Personal Data is a separate advisory group made up of delegates from the Data Protec-
tion Authorities (“DPAs”) of each EU country, as well as delegates from other EU government 
departments, formed pursuant to Article 29 of the EU Directive. ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, 
supra. 
 40 Bennett, supra note 5, at 61. Affected organizations included those with offices in both the 
European Union and the United States, EU organizations that contracted work out to the United 
States, and all organizations that sent data from the European Union to the United States. Id. 
 41 Id. Alternate mechanisms for permissible transatlantic data flow included: (1) entering into 
contracts that incorporated the Model Contract Clauses provided by the European Commission; 
(2) establishing approved binding corporate rules for transfers within a multinational organization; 
or (3) obtaining the “free and informed” consent of the individual whose data was to be trans-
ferred. Mays, supra note 35, at 8. 
 42 See Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 Pursuant to Di-
rective 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protec-
tion Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, 35 (finding that Privacy Shield 
provided the requisite adequate protection for EU data); European Commission Press Release 
IP/16/433, Restoring Trust in Transatlantic Data Flows Through Strong Safeguards: European 
Commission Presents EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Feb. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Privacy Shield Press 
Release] (unveiling Privacy Shield). The European Commission emphasized four critical elements 
of Privacy Shield that were meant to ensure its conformity with the ECJ’s decision in Schrems: (1) 
powerful responsibilities for companies and vigorous enforcement; (2) explicit protections and 
unequivocal commitments regarding access by the U.S. government; (3) efficacious preservation 
of the rights of EU citizens with multiple avenues for redress; and (4) a yearly multilateral assess-
ment process. Privacy Shield Press Release, supra; Corley, supra note 1, at 751. 
 43 Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 29, at 365; see Corley, supra note 1, at 751 (explaining 
that the first of the European Commission’s highly regarded elements, concerning duties and en-
forcement, encompass many of Privacy Shield’s remaining links to Safe Harbor). Like Safe Har-
bor, Privacy Shield includes seven central principles that participating organizations must adhere 
to when collecting and using personal data from the European Union. Corley, supra note 1, at 751. 
Also like Safe Harbor, Privacy Shield makes participation voluntary, allows participating organi-
zations to self-certify their adherence to Privacy Shield’s principles, and subjects participating 
organizations to the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) enforcement power. Corley, supra note 
1, at 752; Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 29, at 365. 
 44 Corley, supra note 1, at 752; Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 29, at 365. Organizations 
may be subject to sanctions or exclusion for non-compliance. Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 
29, at 365. 
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For instance, Privacy Shield requires organizations to notify individu-
als about the collection and use of their data.45 It also establishes more 
stringent conditions and heightened liability for transferring data to third 
parties.46 Privacy Shield requires that participating companies furnish the 
Department of Commerce, upon request, with information about or a copy 
of the relevant contract terms governing data transfers with a third party.47 
Moreover, organizations are liable if a third party to which it transferred 
data does not comply with Privacy Shield, unless the organization can show 
that it did not exercise control over the offending acts.48 Additionally, Privacy 
Shield subjects organizations to the purview of U.S. governmental agencies, 
giving them powers of inquiry and enforcement in order to facilitate conform-
ity with its requirements.49 
A new oversight measure puts explicit limitations on U.S. government 
access to EU personal data.50 Privacy Shield equips EU citizens with multi-
ple options for recourse that were not previously available under Safe Har-
bor.51 Overall, Privacy Shield represents a significant shift from Safe Har-
bor in favor of stronger data protection measures.52 
                                                                                                                           
 45 PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 14, at II(1); Mays, supra note 35, at 8. 
 46 PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 14, at II(7)(d); Corley, supra note 1, at 752; Daugirdas & 
Mortenson, supra note 29, at 365. 
 47 Corley, supra note 1, at 752 n.216. 
 48 Id. Compare PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 14, at II(7)(d) (extending liability for transfers to 
third parties), with U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, supra note 32 (failing to impose liability on partici-
pating organizations when third parties act contrary to the Safe Harbor, unless the organization 
was aware or should have been aware of the act and did not take appropriate action to stop it). 
 49 PRIVACY SHIELD, supra note 14, at I(2); Corley, supra note 1, at 752. 
 50 See Privacy Shield Press Release, supra note 42 (explaining the second European Commis-
sion element regarding U.S. government access). Privacy Shield is the European Union’s first 
written guarantee from the U.S. government and Office of the Director of National Intelligence of 
distinct restraints, protections, and supervision procedures on all national security related govern-
ment use of personal information. Id.; Corley, supra note 1, at 753; Daugirdas & Mortenson, su-
pra note 29, at 365. 
 51 Privacy Shield Press Release, supra note 42; Corley, supra note 1, at 753. Under Privacy 
Shield, individual EU citizens may bring complaints directly to participating organizations that 
they believe are violating the agreement; participating organizations must resolve the complaints 
within forty-five days. Privacy Shield Press Release, supra note 42; Corley, supra note 1, at 753; 
Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 29, at 365. Organizations must also make an alternative dis-
pute resolution process available at no cost. Privacy Shield Press Release, supra note 42. EU citi-
zens may also inform their national DPAs, which will work with the FTC to guarantee the resolu-
tion of their complaints. Id.; Corley, supra note 1, at 753. If a complaint is not resolved by any of 
the aforementioned redress options, EU citizens may obtain an “enforceable remedy” through 
binding arbitration. Privacy Shield Press Release, supra note 42; Corley, supra note 1, at 753. 
 52 See Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 29, at 365 (noting the changes from Safe Harbor to 
Privacy Shield, including “strong obligations,” “robust enforcement,” “clear safeguards and trans-
parency obligations,” and “effective protection”). 
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D. GDPR: The Impending Shake-Up 
On April 27, 2016, the European Union adopted the GDPR to replace 
the 1995 EU Directive.53 The GDPR takes effect on May 25, 2018.54 Alt-
hough the GDPR encompasses some core aspects of the EU Directive, it 
contains many significant differences.55 
The GDPR is broader in scope than the EU Directive, as it applies to all 
data pertaining to a EU citizen, regardless of whether the data is actually pro-
cessed within the European Union.56 This extraterritorial application of EU 
data privacy law will have a huge impact on international data flow and will 
make the GDPR a de facto global standard.57 The regulation not only main-
tains a requirement of adequate protection for data transfers to third-party 
countries, like the EU Directive, but also provides rules for such transfers.58 
The GDPR broadens the range of data types and categories of personal 
data governed in order to keep up with developments in digital technology 
and to strengthen individuals’ control over their information.59 This means 
that companies will have to obtain consent from data subjects for a broader 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regu-
lation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 54 Id. at 86. 
 55 W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data Protection 
Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. L. 221, 222 (2016); see Marianna 
Meriani, Digital Platforms and the Spectrum of Data Protection in Competition Law Analyses, 38 
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 89, 93 (2017) (asserting that the GDPR has significantly altered EU 
data regulation, with the goal of safeguarding data despite worldwide technological and societal 
changes). 
 56 GDPR, supra note 53, at 32; EU Directive, supra note 28, at 39; Allison Callahan-
Slaughter, Lipstick on a Pig: The Future of Transnational Data Flow Between the EU and the 
United States, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 239, 252 (2016). The EU Directive subjects data con-
trollers to regulation only if they process an EU citizen’s personal data within the European Un-
ion; under the GDPR, the consideration is only whether EU personal data is processed. GDPR, 
supra note 53, at 32. Non-EU companies must comply with the same rules as EU companies when 
they make goods or services available to, or observe, people in the European Union. Id. 
 57 See Callahan-Slaughter, supra note 56, at 252 (explaining that the European Union’s global 
market power, in conjunction with the GDPR’s application to all data controllers which process 
EU personal data, means that the GDPR will in effect apply across the globe). 
 58 See GDPR, supra note 53, at 61 (requiring an adequate level of data protection for third-
party country transfers); EU Directive, supra note 28, at 45 (allowing data transfers to third-party 
countries only if that country guarantees an adequate level of protection). Transfers of data to 
third-party countries can occur if the European Commission has verified that the country guaran-
tees adequate protection, approved binding corporate rules are in place, the data controller ensures 
suitable protections, or the subject explicitly consents. GDPR, supra note 53, at 61–64; Callahan-
Slaughter, supra note 56, at 252. 
 59 Callahan-Slaughter, supra note 56, at 251; Meriani, supra note 55, at 94; see, e.g., GDPR, 
supra note 53, at 6 (asserting that individuals might be identifiable by online identifiers made 
available by their devices, like IP addresses and cookie identifiers, information which may be 
compiled to profile someone and determine their identity). 
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array of collection mechanisms and information types.60 Furthermore, “con-
sent” under the GDPR requires data processors to acquire express consent 
from data subjects for their precise intentions, eliminating implied con-
sent.61 The GDPR provides individuals with a new distinct right called the 
“right to be forgotten,” effected through a powerful right to erasure.62 Data 
controllers must also immediately inform their DPA of a personal data 
breach unless they can show that the breach is not likely to adversely affect 
the data subjects’ privacy rights.63 
Unlike the EU Directive, the GDPR explicitly governs orders from for-
eign judiciaries to produce evidence regarding the personal information of EU 
citizens.64 Importantly, the GDPR provides for extremely high sanctions—up 
to four percent of the company’s revenue—for data protection violations.65 
The strengthening of data protection encompassed in the GDPR will have a 
significant and wide-reaching impact on data privacy practices worldwide.66 
E. The European Union Means Business: EU Regulators Are Doling Out 
Serious Punishments for Data Privacy Violations 
The heightened focus and tougher stance on data privacy in the Europe-
an Union in recent years has hinted that EU regulators might start cracking 
down on prominent companies, especially ones that process large amounts of 
EU citizens’ data.67 Predictions of such sort have proven to be true.68 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Meriani, supra note 55, at 94 (including information collected by online identifiers, 
device identifiers, cookie IDs, and IP addresses). Online data processors are resistant to the idea of 
systematically gaining consent for every instance of data collection. Id. It is therefore believed that 
this expansion of the legal requirements for consent may not be very consequential in practice; 
companies typically meet the consent requirement by notifying their users of their data practices in 
“Terms and Conditions” agreements that few users look at or comprehend. Id. 
 61 GDPR, supra note 53, at 34; Callahan-Slaughter, supra note 56, at 251. 
 62 GDPR, supra note 53, at 43; Callahan-Slaughter, supra note 56, at 251. 
 63 GDPR, supra note 53, at 16–17. According to the GDPR, a data breach necessitates imme-
diate notification because it can cause harm to the data subjects. Id. Pseudonymisation is a mecha-
nism for data protection introduced in the GDPR, included as one of the “appropriate safeguards” 
for processing data, whereby identifiable information is replaced by a random code so that the 
individual can no longer be identified by that information. Id. at 29, 33; Meriani, supra note 55, at 
94. 
 64 See infra notes 137–140 and accompanying text (explaining that Article 48 stipulates that 
such orders may only be complied with according to international agreements such as judicial 
assistance treaties). 
 65 Voss, supra note 55, at 229; see GPDR, supra note 53, at 83 (stipulating that specified 
infringements will result in administrative fines up to €20,000,000, or for companies, up to 4% of 
their total worldwide annual revenue for the previous financial year, whichever is higher). 
 66 See Callahan-Slaughter, supra note 56, at 251–52 (discussing the GDPR’s substantial bol-
stering of data protection as well as its global effects). 
 67 See supra notes 28–66 and accompanying text (explaining recent changes in EU data priva-
cy law); see also Bennett, supra note 5, at 63 (quoting Neil Stelzer, the general counsel for Identi-
ty Finder, who predicted in early 2016 that EU regulators would “go after big names that will 
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For example, the Spanish Agency for Data Protection fined Google 
€900,000 in December 2013.69 Not long after, privacy regulators across Eu-
rope combined efforts to probe Facebook’s data practices.70 The coordinat-
ed effort by the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain is 
noteworthy; Facebook had always been subject to the regulatory authority 
of a single country, Ireland, where its European headquarters are located.71 
In anticipation of the forthcoming and pivotal GDPR, however, the DPAs of 
the EU member states have gained the courage to challenge high-powered 
U.S. companies.72 This hyperactive focus on Facebook’s data practices is 
just one example of the increasing EU vitriol towards U.S. technology 
companies.73 
The French DPA, the National Commission on Informatics and Liberty 
(“CNIL”), fined Google, and has publically and formally threatened sanc-
tions against Facebook and Microsoft for data privacy law violations.74 On 
March 10, 2016, the CNIL announced a €100,000 fine against Google for 
disobeying the CNIL’s order regarding the right to delisting.75 On February 
8, 2016, the CNIL published an order demanding that Facebook change the 
                                                                                                                           
make the papers and try to get big fines issued against them”); Sam Schechner, Facebook Privacy 
Controls Face Scrutiny in Europe: Tension Between EU Authorities and U.S. Tech Giants Is Like-
ly to Escalate, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-confronts-
european-probes-1427975994 [https://perma.cc/KZ66-YBXW] [hereinafter Schechner, Facebook 
Privacy] (quoting Christian Wiese Svanberg, a privacy attorney in Copenhagen, who stated that 
inquiries by EU DPAs are indicative of what the future holds for Facebook, and that in the near 
future, similar inquiries will come with the threat of massive sanctions). 
 68 See infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text (explaining enforcement actions by EU 
DPAs against well-known multinational companies like Google, Facebook, and Microsoft). 
 69 David Roman, Google Fined in European Privacy Probe: Five Other Countries May Fol-
low Spanish Example, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424052702304367204579268143320003938 [https://perma.cc/2SBY-V2LK]. Spain was the first 
of the six countries that started investigating Google’s privacy compliance in 2012 to actually fine 
the company. Id. 
 70 Schechner, Facebook Privacy, supra note 67. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. Mathias Moulin, the leader of the National Commission on Informatics and Liberty’s 
(“CNIL”) effort to look into Facebook, is quoted as saying, “We are showing a united front before 
a global actor. It’s time for us to focus on Facebook.” Id. 
 73 Id. Google faces an EU antitrust inquiry; both Amazon and Apple’s corporate tax practices 
are being investigated by the European Union; France and Germany want heightened regulation 
over large U.S. technology companies, “escalat[ing] its war against U.S. technology superpow-
ers”; the European Parliament voted strongly in favor of a resolution to possibly break up Google. 
Id.; Sam Schechner, Europe Targets U.S. Web Firms: French, German Officials Call for Greater 
Power to Regulate Internet Companies, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
french-german-officials-call-for-fresh-look-at-internet-giants-1417110508 [https://perma.cc/4NN4-
J7JM]. 
 74 See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text (describing the actions). 
 75 Julia Floretti, France Fines Google Over ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’ REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-france-privacy-idUSKCN0WQ1WX [https://perma.cc/
BR8N-VS4D]. 
2018] EU Data Privacy Law and U.S. Discovery Orders 1523 
ways it collects and uses information about Internet users within three 
months or face sanctions and fines of up to €150,000.76 On July 20, 2016, 
the CNIL threatened Microsoft with sanctions and fines of up to €150,000 if 
they did not stop tracking browsing patterns of its users and gathering un-
necessary user information.77 The CNIL further ordered Microsoft to im-
prove its data security practices within three months and to cease illegally 
transferring personal information to the United States based on the invali-
dated Safe Harbor.78 
In September 2016, the Hamburg Commissioner for Data Protection and 
Freedom of Information (“HmbBfDI”) ordered WhatsApp, a messaging ap-
plication and Facebook subsidiary, to stop transferring the data of its German 
users to Facebook due to privacy issues.79 In January 2017, the Federation of 
German Consumer Organizations sued the messaging service, alleging that 
the company “partly illegally” gathered data and then transferred it to Face-
book, which could result in a multi-million euro penalty for Facebook.80 In 
addition, the HmbBfDI announced in November 2016 that ten German Data 
Protection Supervision authorities would complete a coordinated audit of 
companies transferring the personal data of EU citizens to non-EU countries, 
with the objective of raising awareness about such data privacy transfers.81 
In the wake of the WhatsApp German lawsuit, Ireland’s Data Protec-
tion Commissioner, Helen Dixon, also stepped up to the plate.82 She created 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Sam Schechner, France’s Privacy Regulator Threatens to Fine Facebook, WALL ST. J.: 
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/frances-privacy-regulator-
threatens-to-fine-facebook-2016-02-08 [https://perma.cc/F9S6-T83B]. 
 77 CNIL, Windows 10: CNIL Publicly Serves Formal Notice to Microsoft Corporation to 
Comply with the French Data Protection Act Within Three Months (July 20, 2016), https://www.
cnil.fr/en/windows-10-cnil-publicly-serves-formal-notice-microsoft-corporation-comply-french-
data-protection [https://perma.cc/3KFZ-94Q7]; France Threatens Microsoft with Sanctions for 
Tracking & Collecting ‘Excessive’ User Info, RT (July 21, 2016), https://www.rt.com/news/35241
7-france-microsoft-user-data/ [https://perma.cc/SDT5-G5BF]. 
 78 CNIL, supra note 77. The CNIL investigated Microsoft in April and June of 2016 and 
found several deficiencies in the company’s privacy practices, including unnecessary information 
gathering, insecure login methods, insufficient consent obtained from users to track their behavior, 
no notice given of advertising cookies, and the continued conveyance of data to the United States 
based on the invalidated Safe Harbor. Id. 
 79 Germany Bans WhatsApp Data Transfer to Facebook, DW (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.dw.
com/en/germany-bans-whatsapp-data-transfer-to-facebook/a-35903021 [https://perma.cc/74UQ-
RKVR]. 
 80 German Consumer Group Sues WhatsApp, DW (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/
german-consumer-group-sues-whatsapp/a-37335926 [https://perma.cc/5UUJ-7L84]. 
 81 Hamburg Comm’r for Data Prot. & Freedom of Info. (“HmbBfDI”), Data Protection Au-
thorities of the Länder Are Checking Cross-Border Data Transfers, HMBBFDI, https://www.daten
schutz-hamburg.de/news/detail/article/datenschutzaufsichtsbehoerden-der-laender-pruefen-grenzueber
schreitende-datenuebermittlungen.html?tx_ttnews[backPid]=170&cHash=756c8c2e6bddd3d4678
99f35fc3c110a [https://perma.cc/XRV5-RAL5]. 
 82 Schechner, Ireland’s Privacy Cop, supra note 2. 
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a ten-person task force to investigate multinational technology companies 
and put Facebook and WhatsApp through the wringer at the agency’s offic-
es.83 With Ireland as the home of several technology titans’ European head-
quarters, including Facebook, Apple, Google, and Airbnb, Dixon is posi-
tioned to shape data privacy’s global landscape over the coming years.84 
II. THE DISCOVERY DILEMMA: WHEN U.S. DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
CONTRAVENE EU DATA PRIVACY PROTECTION 
Discovery is the official process dictated by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure through which litigants request and provide information for the 
purpose of deciphering the facts of a case and what may come to light at tri-
al.85 The discovery process in the United States can be extremely time-
consuming and in-depth, especially when compared to the rest of the world.86 
Notably, even when requested discovery materials are located outside of the 
United States or revealing them is limited or illegal under foreign law, U.S. 
courts have the power to compel parties to provide them.87 If a litigant does 
not comply with a discovery order, the court can impose sanctions.88 
This Part explores the conflict between EU data privacy law and the dis-
covery process in U.S. litigation.89 Section A explains the intersection of U.S. 
discovery procedures and foreign law, including how U.S. courts approach the 
issue.90 Section B explores the specific problem posed when a party in posses-
sion of personal information of EU citizens, protected by EU data privacy law, 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. Dixon said, “The standards that we set in Europe will influence how data privacy is 
done around the world.” Id. According to Ireland’s Data Protection Commissioner, Ireland will be 
steadfast and resolute in administering the forthcoming GDPR. Id. 
 85 SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 1; see Discovery, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining discovery as the mandatory divulgence of information associated with a 
legal action); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (outlining the federal discovery rules). 
 86 Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Practical In-House Approaches for Cross-
Border Discovery & Data Protection, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 397, 405–06 (2016) [hereinafter Sedo-
na Conference Discovery and Data Protection]; Steven C. Bennett, EU Privacy vs. U.S. Discov-
ery: Practical Responses to the Conflict, 58 PRAC. L. 31, 32 (2012); see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) 
(describing the types of discoverable information). The common law approach is that justice will 
be best achieved when adversarial litigants conduct discovery themselves; the civil law approach 
presumes that the judicial branch is the most prudent conductor of discovery procedures and will 
best protect individuals’ fundamental right to privacy. Sedona Conference Discovery and Data 
Protection, supra, at 405. Pre-trial discovery is very limited in most civil law countries, which do 
not compel the production of any more information than is essential to argue a case. Id. at 406. 
 87 SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 2. 
 88 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (providing that the court can impose sanctions for noncompli-
ance with a discovery order, including “payment of expenses”). 
 89 See infra notes 93–142 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 93–126 and accompanying text. 
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is asked to produce that information during litigation in a U.S court.91 Section 
C discusses the potential effects of the GDPR on discovery deliberations in the 
United States.92 
A. U.S. Discovery Rules vs. Foreign Law: How U.S.  
Courts Determine the Victor 
When a discovery order conflicts with foreign law, U.S. courts must 
carefully consider how best to proceed.93 A primary source of guidance in 
these instances is the Hague Evidence Convention (“Hague Convention”), 
an international assistance agreement that governs the collection of evi-
dence abroad.94 The principle of international comity also informs courts’ 
decisions in these instances.95 
1. The Hague Convention: An International Effort to Alleviate Cross-
Border Discovery Woes 
The Hague Convention is an international judicial assistance agree-
ment between fifty-nine countries, including the United States and most EU 
member states.96 The Hague Convention aims to increase harmonization in 
international litigation by reconciling differing or conflicting practices.97 
Accordingly, it provides specific mechanisms for courts in one nation to 
request evidence located in another.98 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See infra notes 67–136 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 137–142 and accompanying text. 
 93 SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 94 Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 522 (1987). 
 95 Id. at 543–44. 
 96 David P. Stewart, Private International Law: A Dynamic and Developing Field, 30 U. PA. 
J. INT’L L. 1121, 1122 (2009). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522; Stewart, supra note 96. See generally Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Convention] 
(providing transnational discovery procedures). Twenty-five of the twenty-eight EU member 
states are parties to the Hague Convention. Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Status Table: 
20: Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=82 [https://perma.
cc/7QND-B72S]. The Convention is applicable only between states that are parties to it and con-
tains two methods for taking evidence: (1) Letters of Request, and (2) diplomatic or consular 
agents and commissioners. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, OUTLINE: EVIDENCE 
CONVENTION 1 (2010), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/ec1fc148-c2b1-49dc-ba2f-65f45cb2b2d3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9765-9LNL] [hereinafter HAGUE CONVENTION OUTLINE]. Judiciaries may also 
seek evidence located abroad by means of letters rogatory, a comparable mechanism to Letters of 
Request used when there is no treaty in place, but one that involves diplomatic channels. See Lou-
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Litigants commonly seek to have information obtained through the 
Hague Convention’s Letter of Request function when a discovery request 
involves information located abroad and if disclosure would violate foreign 
data privacy law.99 That mechanism is preferable to the litigants producing 
it themselves and possibly violating privacy laws and facing sanctions.100 
Although the Hague Convention provides that Letters of Request must be 
promptly executed by contracting states, there are several exceptions by 
which a state may refuse to comply.101 The U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that, while the Hague Convention provides options for acquiring evidence 
located abroad, its procedures are neither mandatory nor the exclusive 
means of doing so.102 
2. International Comity: Recognition of Foreign Sovereignty 
Even though U.S. courts are not required to comply with foreign dis-
covery law or the Hague Convention procedures, their use can help to ac-
count for foreign interests.103 The judicial principle of respect for the sover-
eign power of other countries is called international comity.104 This concept, 
which seeks a middle ground between mere courtesy and complete defer-
ence, has been acknowledged in U.S. jurisprudence since the 1800s.105 
Comity involves the balancing of international and domestic interests to 
gauge if, and to what extent, one nation will allow the law of another nation 
                                                                                                                           
is B. Kimmelman & Steven L. Smith, The Hague Evidence Convention, in BUSINESS AND COM-
MERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 21:89 (4th ed. 2016) (defining letters rogatory). 
 99 See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522. The Letter of Request method consists of the judicial 
authority of one state requesting that an appropriate authority of another state acquire evidence for 
use in litigation in the requesting state. HAGUE CONVENTION OUTLINE, supra note 98, at 1. The 
Hague Convention requires all contracting states to establish a “Central Authority” to process 
Letters of Request from judicial authorities of other states and disseminate them to the proper 
national authorities. Hague Convention, supra note 98, at art. 2. 
 100 See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522. 
 101 Hague Convention, supra note 98, at arts. 5, 9; Kimmelman & Smith, supra note 98. Arti-
cle 9 instructs that a Letter of Request must be performed promptly. Hague Convention, supra 
note 98, at art. 9. Article 5 provides that a Central Authority can oppose a Letter of Request that it 
regards as outside the Hague Convention’s scope or noncompliant with its requirements, but must 
immediately inform the requesting state’s Central Authority. Id. at art. 5. Article 12 limits refusal 
of Letters of Request to situations where execution outside the scope of that court’s authority and 
where execution would bias the “sovereignty or security” of the nation. Id. at art. 12; Kimmelman 
& Smith, supra note 98. 
 102 See infra notes 114–122 and accompanying text. 
 103 Diego Zambrano, A Comity of Errors: The Rise, Fall, and Return of International Comity 
in Transnational Discovery, 34 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 157, 173–75 (2016). 
 104 Id. at 161; see Comity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining comity as a 
custom between governmental bodies, such as sovereign nations or judiciaries, in which they 
acknowledge each other’s laws and authority). 
 105 Zambrano, supra note 103. 
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to apply within its jurisdiction.106 In other words, even if a court has juris-
diction over a case and its parties, the doctrine of international comity obli-
gates judges to contemplate how the outcome will affect the concerned for-
eign nations.107 
Three decades ago, the Supreme Court provided a multi-factor balanc-
ing test for determining when U.S. courts should exercise their authority to 
compel production of evidence constrained by foreign law.108 The balancing 
test considers five factors: (1) the significance of the requested discovery in 
regard to the litigation; (2) the precision of the request; (3) whether the re-
quested information was generated in the United States; (4) the availability 
of an alternate method for acquiring the discovery materials; and (5) the 
damage to the United States’ or foreign nation’s concerns if the discovery is 
not executed.109 
The controlling U.S. Supreme Court case on the international comity 
analysis is Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Iowa.110 There, the plaintiffs, survi-
vors of a plane crash involving the defendants’ plane, sought discovery in-
formation physically located in France.111 The defendants, French aircraft 
companies, filed a motion for a protective order, claiming that the Hague 
Convention was the appropriate means for obtaining it.112 The defendants 
further asserted that a French penal statute prevented them from complying 
with the discovery request and that complying could subject them to crimi-
nal liability.113 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895); Zambrano, supra note 103. 
 107 Zambrano, supra note 103, at 161–62. 
 108 See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28 (providing the balancing test); SEDONA CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 4, at 2–3 (noting that the Aerospatiale balancing test is used to decide whether to 
order discovery from parties in violation of foreign law). 
 109 See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442 (AM. LAW INST. 1987)). 
 110 Id. at 533. In Aerospatiale, two French defendants were sued in U.S. federal court for 
personal injuries caused by an aircraft accident. Id. at 522. The defendants were French govern-
ment-owned aircraft corporations. Id. at 524–25. When the plaintiffs sued in the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the defendants did not dispute the district court’s jurisdic-
tion and answered the complaints. Id. at 525. 
 111 Id.at 525. 
 112 Id. at 524–25. The defendants had willingly participated in initial discovery, which in-
volved evidence located in the United States, but the second round of discovery requested evi-
dence located in France. Id. at 525 n.4. 
 113 Id. at 526 n.6. French Penal Code Law No. 80-538, the French blocking statute, stipulates 
in Article 1A that: 
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and regulations, it 
is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in writing, orally or other-
wise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or infor-
mation leading to the constitution of evidence with a view to foreign judicial or ad-
ministrative proceedings or in connection therewith. 
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The defendants argued that Hague Convention procedures were the 
sole means for procuring evidence located within a signatory country.114 
They argued, in the alternative, that the Court should establish a rule of first 
resort to Hague Convention mechanisms, prior to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.115 The Court rejected both arguments.116 
The Court insisted that the international comity analysis demands a de-
tailed evaluation of the interests of both the nation requesting discovery and 
the foreign nation.117 To weigh those competing interests, the Court adopted 
the approach in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States.118 Section 442 indicates the five factors that are pertinent to interna-
tional comity analysis.119 In addition to these factors, the Court prescribed 
two other considerations.120 First, the Court specified the need for the “exer-
cise [of] special vigilance” by U.S courts during pretrial proceedings, so as to 
shield foreign parties from unwarranted, useless, or excessively onerous dis-
covery.121 Second, U.S. courts must be mindful of unique difficulties facing 
foreign parties, as well as the sovereign state’s demonstrated interests.122 
                                                                                                                           
Id. Article 3 provides for a punishment of two to six months in jail, a fine of 10,000 to 120,000 
francs, or both, for violating Article 1A. In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 
F.2d 120, 126 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 114 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 529. The French government agreed with the defendants in an 
amicus brief submitted to the Court. Id. at 529 n.11; Brief for Republic of France as Amicus Curi-
ae at 4, Aerospatiale,482 U.S. 522 (No. 85-1695). 
 115 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 541–42. 
 116 Id. at 541–43. The Court rejected the defendants’ first argument, deciding instead that 
Hague Convention procedures are optional and at the court’s disposal when it will make conduct-
ing foreign discovery easier. Id. at 541. The Court also rejected the defendants’ second argument, 
reasoning that it would be incompatible with U.S. courts’ paramount interest in “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination” of legal proceedings. Id. at 542–43. The Court noted that Letters of 
Request are more time consuming and expensive and less effective than the evidentiary rules set 
forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 542. The Court dismissed the French blocking 
statute, noting well-established precedent that such laws did not prevent U.S. courts from compel-
ling discovery that might defy them. Id. at 544 n.29. The Court also pointed to the American Law 
Institute’s determination that blocking statutes should not be deferred to at the same level as sub-
stantive foreign laws. Id. The Court concluded that the French statute merely demonstrated foreign 
interests. Id. The Court also noted that by the nature of international comity, neither the Court’s 
discovery order nor the French blocking statute could have absolute authority. Id. 
 117 Id. at 543–44. The Court refused to adopt an outright rule that international comity auto-
matically leads to use of the Hague Convention without a comprehensive inquiry into the specific 
circumstances of each individual case, the concerns of the foreign nations involved, and the prob-
ability of success of the Hague Convention’s methods. Id. at 544. 
 118 Id. at 544 n.28. 
 119 Id.; supra note 109 and accompanying text (describing the five factors). The court asserted 
that any examination of international comity involved those factors, but noted that this approach 
was not necessarily fitting with the global consensus. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28. 
 120 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546. 
 121 Id. The Court noted that courts must monitor pretrial proceedings for abusive discovery 
especially carefully when evidence is sought abroad and must take claims by foreign parties of 
abusive discovery very seriously. Id.; see Discovery Abuse, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
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U.S. courts apply the factors laid out in Aerospatiale to determine how 
to conduct discovery regarding evidence located abroad, with particular 
emphasis on balancing foreign and U.S. interests.123 The balancing test, 
however, permits courts to easily prioritize U.S. interests over foreign inter-
ests, because the U.S. Supreme Court did not provide an explicit procedure 
for weighing them.124 The legacy of Aerospatiale, therefore, was a rise in 
expansive U.S. discovery, with international comity falling by the way-
side.125 In fact, in an overwhelming majority of cases where the balancing 
test was applied, the court decided that U.S. interests outweighed foreign 
interests and ordered discovery to be conducted under U.S. rules.126 
                                                                                                                           
2014) (defining discovery abuse as the inappropriate use of the discovery phase of litigation, espe-
cially by means of excessive information requests that are unimportant or impermissible, or en-
gaging in discovery with an ulterior motive). 
 122 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546. The Court acknowledged that it was not providing explicit 
rules for this deliberation of foreign problems and interests. Id. The Court cited the well-
established consideration of international comity in adjudicating cases connected with foreign 
nations as either parties to the litigation or as sovereigns with an interest in the outcome. Id. 
 123 David J. Kessler et al., The Potential Impact of Article 48 of the General Data Protection 
Regulation on Cross Border Discovery from the United States, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 575, 600 
(2016); see Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 183 F. Supp. 3d 409, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The fifth 
factor—the balancing of national interests—is the most important, as it directly addresses the 
relations between sovereign nations.”); see also supra notes 110–122 and accompanying text 
(describing the Aerospatiale case). 
 124 Zambrano, supra note 103, at 176; see Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188, 
189 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (lamenting that the Aerospatiale Court “declined to set forth specific rules to 
guide such exercise of judicial discretion”). The Aerospatiale test seemed to consider foreign 
interests only superficially and was criticized on several fronts: (1) U.S. judges were not suffi-
ciently knowledgeable about foreign law to properly evaluate foreign interests; (2) the test gave 
district courts expansive authority on discovery without adequate supervision by appellate courts; 
and (3) the test enabled courts to dismiss the concept of international comity and prioritize U.S. 
interests. Zambrano, supra note 103, at 176–77. 
 125 Zambrano, supra note 103, at 176–77. Most courts deliberating over discovery acknowl-
edged the Hague Convention pro forma, but ultimately declined to resort to it. Id.; see infra note 
126 and accompanying text (providing examples). 
 126 Kessler et al., supra note 123, at 600; see, e.g., Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 
2d 548, 558–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (determining that U.S. interests in “fully and fairly adjudicating 
matters before its courts” and its counterterrorism efforts outweighed China’s interests in banking 
secrecy laws and sovereignty concerns); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 222–23 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that U.S. and French interests in subverting the funding of terrorism 
exceeded France’s interests in stopping the defendant from complying with the discovery requests, 
protecting the privacy of bank customers, and administering its national banking, money launder-
ing, anti-terrorism, and criminal investigation laws). U.S. courts have ruled that insubstantial or 
questionable U.S. interests exceed foreign interests even when the foreign interests were signifi-
cant. Zambrano, supra note 103, at 176. Uncommonly, courts have found that discovery should be 
conducted pursuant to the Hague Convention or not conducted at all. Kessler et al., supra note 
123, at 602–03; Zambrano, supra note 103, at 177; see, e.g., In re Payment Card Interchange Fee 
& Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., No. 05-MD-1720(JG)(JO), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89275, at *29 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010); In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 356 (D. Conn. 
1991); Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. 2015). 
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B. The Intersection Between EU Data Privacy Obligations  
and U.S. Civil Procedure Discovery Rules 
Foreign data privacy law oftentimes protects information requested 
during the discovery phase of litigation.127 U.S. courts, however, have the 
power to compel the production of requested information, despite the fact 
that disclosing it may be constrained or forbidden by foreign law.128 While 
courts do take the party’s subjugation to foreign data privacy law into con-
sideration, the possibility of foreign civil or criminal sanctions against the 
party is not determinative of a court’s decision to require production.129 
Therefore, companies engaged in litigation in the United States may be 
forced to respond to discovery requests that place them directly in breach of 
EU data privacy law.130 
International comity for discovery purposes often comes up in the con-
text of the Hague Convention and blocking statutes.131 Blocking statutes are 
data privacy laws enacted with the distinct purpose of shielding a country’s 
nationals from broad discovery orders in foreign court proceedings.132 Thus, 
                                                                                                                           
 127 SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at *2. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.29 (explaining that the French blocking statute’s ap-
plicability to the defendants was relevant to the Court’s evaluation of international comity merely 
insofar as it demonstrated the foreign interests in the security of certain information, a factor to be 
weighed). 
 130 SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 3; see, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Serv. Anti-
trust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 54–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that neither party disputed the fact that 
compliance by the French litigant with an order to produce the relevant documents would amount 
to violating the French blocking statute and give rise to the possibility of criminal sanctions). Alt-
hough U.S. sanctions are normally not imposed when the litigant has made an “active, good-faith 
effort” to obey a discovery order, a litigant merely pointing to data privacy laws, such as blocking 
statutes, or to the existence of the Hague Convention, is not enough to forestall sanctions; litigants 
would have to demonstrate a sincere attempt to comply, such as seeking an exception from their 
home government authority or producing as much information as possible. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, 
Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Robert F. Koets, Annotation, Sanctions for Failure to 
Make Discovery Under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 37 as Affected by Defaulting Party’s Good 
Faith Efforts to Comply, 134 A.L.R. Fed. 257 at § 2[a], 4 (1996). 
 131 See, e.g., Air Cargo, 278 F.R.D. at 52 (deciding whether to compel discovery through the 
Hague Convention when the discovery order would contravene France’s blocking statute); 
Strauss, 242 F.R.D. at 206 (deciding whether to compel discovery through the Hague Convention 
when the discovery order would contravene France’s blocking statute); see also supra notes 98–
102 and accompanying text (explaining the Hague Convention). 
 132 Bennett, supra note 86, at 31–32. Some countries have instituted blocking statutes to re-
strain the expansive or “intrusive” scope of U.S. discovery. Sedona Conference Discovery and 
Data Protection, supra note 86, at 407; John T. Yip, Addressing the Costs and Comity Concerns 
of International E-Discovery, 87 WASH. L. REV. 595, 615 (2012). Countries such as France, Chi-
na, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have enacted blocking statutes. Yip, supra. Block-
ing statutes are commonly met with skepticism in American courts. Sedona Conference Discovery 
and Data Protection, supra note 86, at 407. 
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blocking statutes create a clash between foreign data privacy law and U.S. 
discovery rules.133 
When faced with a conflict between discovery needs and EU data pri-
vacy law, U.S. courts have sometimes decided to not require foreign liti-
gants to produce evidence that would violate privacy laws.134 Overwhelm-
ingly, however, U.S. courts have disregarded EU data privacy laws and or-
dered the relevant discovery.135 Even after a French citizen was criminally 
prosecuted and fined €10,000 for complying with a U.S. court order to pro-
duce documents in violation of a French blocking statute in 2007, subse-
quent cases dismissed such sanctions as unrealistic.136 
C. Stepping into the Unknown: The GDPR’s Potential Effect on Discovery 
In Article 48, the GDPR imposes specific conditions for transfers to 
third-party countries.137 Article 48 stipulates that any non-EU court, tribu-
nal, or administrative decision which orders a data controller to provide or 
divulge personal information can be acknowledged or enforced only if the 
order is based on an international agreement, such as a judicial assistance 
treaty.138 The U.S. Supreme Court in Aerospatiale noted that for interna-
tional comity purposes, substantive foreign laws should be given more def-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Sedona Conference Discovery and Data Protection, supra note 86, at 407. 
 134 See SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining that in some instances courts 
have decided against ordering discovery because of significant privacy interests); see, e.g., 
Volkswagen, 909 S.W.2d at 903 (holding that a German company was not required to produce a 
phone book that contained personal information in violation of German data privacy law because 
Germany’s interests in privacy rights would be subverted, alternative means of obtaining the re-
quested information existed, and the phone book was not significant to the case). 
 135 See Kessler et al., supra note 123, at 600 (stating that the majority of courts have decided 
to compel discovery under U.S. rules rather than the Hague Convention); see, e.g., Laydon, 183 F. 
Supp. 3d at 420–26 (requiring that defendants comply with plaintiffs’ discovery request in viola-
tion of the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act); Fenerjian v. Nong Shim Co., Ltd., No. 13-cv-
04115-WHO (DMR), 2016 WL 245263, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016) (granting plaintiff’s 
motion to compel production of contact information for former employees in violation of Korea’s 
Personal Information Protection Act). 
 136 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Paris, crim., Dec. 12, 
2007, Bull. crim., No. 7168 [JurisData No. 2007-83228] (Fr.) [hereinafter Christopher X] (uphold-
ing the criminal conviction of the French party under the blocking statute for not complying with 
the Hague Convention, as well as the €10,000 fine against him); see also Strauss, 242 F.R.D. at 
228 (ordering the French defendant to produce documents pursuant to U.S. discovery rules); Air 
Cargo, 278 F.R.D. at 54 (dismissing the possibility of criminal prosecution pursuant to the block-
ing statute as unlikely despite Christopher X and differentiating the case at bar because in Chris-
topher X the defendant attempted to bypass the blocking statute by “deceptive means”). 
 137 GDPR, supra note 53, at 64. No comparable provision existed in the EU Directive, so 
Article 48 may have unpredictable effects on cross-border discovery. Kessler et al., supra note 
123, at 577. 
 138 GDPR, supra note 53, at 64. 
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erence than blocking statutes, which exist merely to impede discovery.139 
Whether courts view Article 48 of the GDPR as substantive data privacy law 
or as more similar to a blocking statute will heavily affect their decision to 
compel discovery.140 Furthermore, the mere anticipation of the GDPR seems 
to have encouraged the EU DPAs to sanction large multinational companies 
for data privacy violations.141 The atmosphere of EU data privacy is therefore 
clearly trending towards a toughening of data privacy protection.142 
III. INCREASED ENFORCEMENT AND EXPANSION OF EU DATA PRIVACY 
LAW JUSTIFY MORE DEFERENCE IN U.S. DISCOVERY DELIBERATIONS 
The purpose of the international comity analysis is to determine whether, 
and to what extent, foreign interests outweigh those of the United States.143 
While it is not appropriate in every case to rule that discovery should be con-
ducted pursuant to the Hague Convention, foreign interests in the right to pri-
vacy should not be dismissed merely because it seems unlikely that a foreign 
litigant will be prosecuted for violations of data privacy law.144 In order to 
duly respect EU data privacy law, U.S. courts must be willing to consider 
how important the right to privacy is in the European Union and the fact that 
litigants face an increasing risk of sanctions for data privacy violations.145 
Dismissing foreign interests as inherently less important than U.S. interests 
runs counter to the concept of international comity and the purpose of the 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.29. 
 140 Kessler et al., supra note 123, at 610. 
 141 See Schechner, Facebook Privacy, supra note 67 (noting that EU regulators are increasing 
enforcement actions in anticipation of a pivotal shift in the law); see also supra notes 53–66 and 
accompanying text (explaining the GDPR and its momentous impact on the future of data privacy, 
including that EU member states will have the formidable ability to fine companies up to four 
percent of their global revenue). 
 142 See supra notes 28–66 and accompanying text (explaining the evolution of EU data priva-
cy laws, with each new law imposing stronger obligations on data controllers than the previous 
one); see also supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text (explaining the increased enforcement of 
data privacy laws by EU regulators). 
 143 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); Zambrano, supra note 103, at 161. 
 144 See Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987) (laying out a five-factor balancing test for determining if and when 
foreign interests are significant enough to outweigh U.S. interests); In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) 
Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2592, 2016 WL 3923873, at *17–18 (E.D. La. July 21, 2016) (deter-
mining in part that German interests in privacy outweighed U.S. interests despite the fact that the 
German defendant did not prove a cognizable chance of prosecution under German data privacy 
law because German law prioritizes privacy and the German government demonstrated its dedica-
tion to that right). 
 145 See Xarelto, 2016 WL 3923873, at *17 (considering the fact that Germany had a notable 
stake in safeguarding the personal information of its citizenry); see also supra notes 28–66 and 
accompanying text (explaining the toughening of EU data privacy laws and potential for large 
sanctions in the future); supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text (explaining how EU regulators 
are cracking down on multinational companies for data privacy violations). 
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Hague Convention.146 Section A of this Part discusses how U.S. courts should 
adjust their international comity analysis to properly respect EU data privacy 
law, and contends that courts should heavily weigh both EU interests in the 
right to privacy and the increased risk to litigants for violating EU data priva-
cy law in favor of ordering discovery through the Hague Convention.147 Sec-
tion A also explains alternative methods for protecting information governed 
by EU data privacy law.148 Section B provides policy arguments in favor of 
deferring to EU data privacy law when appropriate.149 
A. U.S. Courts Should Increase Weight on the Fifth Aerospatiale Factor 
and Compel Discovery Through the Hague Convention if Appropriate 
U.S. courts should respect EU data privacy law when considering dis-
covery orders by adjusting their approach under the international comity 
analysis and, specifically, in regards to the fifth factor.150 U.S. courts have 
historically found that U.S. interests in compelling discovery outweigh a 
foreign nation’s interests in data privacy.151 While it will not always be ap-
propriate to rule that discovery should be conducted pursuant to the Hague 
Convention, U.S. courts should strongly consider foreign interests in priva-
cy, and not merely as a matter of form.152 
The Hague Convention provides a viable method for conducting for-
eign discovery that respects the sovereign interests of the nations in-
volved.153 Its procedures allow litigants to comply with their data privacy 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Zambrano, supra note 103, at 177 (asserting that the overwhelming trend of cases 
finding that even insubstantial U.S. interests outweighed significant foreign interests was a 
“wholesale and total rejection of both international comity and the Hague Convention”); supra 
notes 98–102 and accompanying text (explaining the Hague Convention). 
 147 See infra notes 150–164 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 165–169 and accompanying text. 
 149 See infra notes 173–192 and accompanying text. 
 150 See SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 7 (advocating for courts to respect foreign 
data privacy laws and the concerns of people governed by them in the context of discovery); supra 
notes 117–122 and accompanying text (describing the Aerospatiale balancing test); supra note 
123 and accompanying text (explaining that the fifth Aerospatiale factor has historically been the 
most significant). 
 151 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (explaining how U.S. courts overwhelmingly 
rule that a foreign nation’s interest in information privacy is secondary to U.S. interests); see also 
supra note 126 and accompanying text (explaining the same phenomenon in international comity 
cases generally). 
 152 See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text (explaining how U.S. courts superficially 
consider foreign interests and use of the Hague Convention before ultimately favoring U.S. inter-
ests and discovery rules); infra notes 173–192 and accompanying text (explaining policy argu-
ments in favor of privacy rights and respecting foreign law). 
 153 Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
(asserting that the Hague Convention established viable methods for litigants to conduct foreign 
discovery). The four-judge opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part actually advocated for 
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obligations while still achieving the goal of obtaining the relevant infor-
mation.154 Indeed, the United States was instrumental in creating the Hague 
Convention, and it seems odd that its courts have so frequently refused to 
use it.155 U.S. courts should not hesitate to compel discovery through the 
Hague Convention when justified.156 
The evolution of EU data privacy law over the last two decades shows 
an increasing trend towards stronger protections for data privacy and greater 
obligations and liability for data controllers.157 The forthcoming GDPR 
should be considered substantive law and deferred to at a higher degree than 
blocking statutes because it explicitly declares the European Union’s desire 
to preserve the privacy of its citizens’ information and heightens sanctions 
for violations.158 While, in the past, courts may have been correct in stating 
that there was a minimal chance of data privacy laws being enforced, they 
can no longer conclusively say so.159 The fact that enforcement is expected 
                                                                                                                           
a rule of first resort to the Hague Convention. Id. at 548–49 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, 
J., O’Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 154 See id. at 561, 565 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (asserting that 
the Hague Convention established viable methods for litigants to conduct foreign discovery and 
that the Hague Convention is completely compatible with laws like the French blocking statute 
that allow for discovery pursuant to international agreements); Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 183 
F. Supp. 3d 409, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (explaining the defendants’ assertion that they wished to 
have the requested information produced in a matter compatible with their duties under UK data 
privacy law and that the Hague Convention is a sufficient alternate method for the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure because the United Kingdom regularly executes Hague Convention discovery 
requests). 
 155 Zambrano, supra note 103, at 177; see Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 549 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part) (noting that the United States advocated for and eagerly 
engaged in the creation of the Hague Convention). 
 156 See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 550 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
(maintaining that the Hague Convention advances U.S. interests because it supplies alternative 
foreign discovery methods that resolve the differences between civil and common law approaches 
to discovery, as well as promotes the U.S. long-term goal of fostering a peaceful international 
environment); infra notes 153–155 and accompanying text (explaining the viability of the Hague 
Convention). 
 157 See In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 4:17-CV-578, 2016 WL 3923873, 
at *17 (E.D. La. July 21, 2016) (considering the fact that Germany recently changed its Data Pro-
tection Act to more strongly safeguard personal information when balancing the U.S. and German 
national interests). 
 158 Kessler et al., supra note 123, at 609–10; see Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.29 (noting 
that substantive laws deserve more deference than blocking statutes); see also supra notes 137–
140 and accompanying text (explaining Article 48 of the GDPR). 
 159 See Bennett, supra note 5, at 63 (positing that recent developments in EU law mean that 
companies in U.S. litigation might be able to more successfully argue that there is a true threat of 
sanctions for violating them) (citing Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); 
Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, Nos. 80 Civ. 1911 (PNL), 82 Civ. 0375 (PNL), 
1984 WL 423, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)); see also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 
221 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (refusing to accept the French blocking statute as a reason that litigants 
could not comply with discovery demands in part because “there is no significant risk of prosecu-
tion for violations of the French blocking statute”); supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text 
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to escalate, as well as the significant sanctions provided for under the forth-
coming GDPR, should be considered.160 EU regulators have been cracking 
down on data privacy violations and imposing substantial fines on promi-
nent companies that process EU citizens’ data.161 Accordingly, U.S. courts 
should start taking the threat of EU sanctions seriously and consider the 
adverse effects of ordering foreign litigants to violate EU data privacy 
laws.162 The Second and Ninth circuits consider the “hardship” or harm that 
would be caused to litigants if they were ordered to violate foreign law.163 
Given these developments, as well as policy considerations for international 
comity and privacy, U.S. courts should no longer dismiss EU privacy inter-
ests when weighing the fifth factor identified in Aerospatiale and compel 
discovery through the Hague Convention when appropriate.164 
Alternatively, should U.S. courts be unwilling to find that the Hague 
Convention is the proper means for obtaining information located in the 
European Union, there are other options for safeguarding the personal in-
formation of EU citizens from disclosure in U.S. discovery.165 First, courts 
                                                                                                                           
(summarizing the increase in EU enforcement actions against large multinational companies for 
data privacy violations). 
 160 See supra notes 65–66 (explaining that the GDPR imposes high sanctions for data privacy 
violations of up to 4% of a company’s annual revenue); see also Kessler et al., supra note 123, at 
609 (stating that it is believed that EU DPAs will intensify enforcement when the GDPR comes 
into force). 
 161 See supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text (describing enforcement actions by EU 
DPAs against companies like Google, Facebook, and Microsoft that included fines of hundreds of 
thousands of Euros). There is also a generally hostile attitude towards U.S. technology companies 
in the European Union. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (pointing out the EU hostility 
towards U.S. companies like Google, Amazon, and Apple). 
 162 See supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text (summarizing the increase in EU enforce-
ment actions against large multinational companies for data privacy violations). 
 163 See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that beyond the five Aerospatiale factors, the court has also examined how incompatible 
legal obligations would adversely affect a foreign litigant); United States v. First Nat. City Bank, 
396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that when a litigant is subject to the laws of two coun-
tries, the court must contemplate how incompatible legal obligations would adversely affect that 
litigant). 
 164 See SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining that in some instances courts 
have decided against ordering discovery because of significant privacy interests); supra notes 
117–122 and accompanying text (describing the Aerospatiale balancing test for international com-
ity analysis); infra notes 176–183 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of international 
comity); infra notes 184–192 and accompanying text (explaining why privacy rights are worthy of 
protection); see, e.g., Xarelto, 2016 WL 3923873, at *17–18 (determining in part that German 
privacy interests outweighed U.S. interests because Germany’s law and government prioritize 
privacy); Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900, 901–03 (Tex. 2015) (holding that a Ger-
man company was not required to produce personal information in violation of German data pri-
vacy law in part because Germany’s interests in privacy rights would be subverted). 
 165 See infra notes 166–169 and accompanying text (describing alternatives). 
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can limit the scope of discovery conducted in the European Union.166 Sec-
ond, courts can encourage use of measures like protective orders and redac-
tion when EU personal data is produced in discovery.167 A protective order 
demonstrates to DPAs that data privacy laws are being acknowledged and 
that the private information will be dealt with appropriately.168 Privacy is 
not only worthy of protection, but it is also a fundamental right in the Euro-
pean Union, and so it should be preserved as much as possible.169 
B. Policy Reasons for Respecting EU Data Privacy Law 
There are rationales for deferring to foreign law in some instances be-
yond mere legal arguments.170 For instance, courts looking to the principle 
of international comity for guidance would be beneficial in many ways.171 
Additionally, privacy is an important right and courts should aspire to pro-
tect it whenever possible.172 
This section discusses policy rationales for respecting the EU’s data 
privacy laws and its interest in privacy rights.173 Subsubsection One ex-
plains the benefits of international comity and the harm that could result 
from dismissing it.174 Subsubsection Two explains why the right to privacy 
is important and should be protected.175 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 12 (prescribing that the range of information 
requested in discovery should be restricted to information that is pertinent and required for the 
litigation to reduce hardship caused by incompatible legal obligations, as well as harm to the sub-
ject of the information). 
 167 See id. at 16, 17 (advocating for courts to preserve information protected by foreign data 
privacy law and curtail the harm to foreign litigants from incompatible discovery and data privacy 
duties through protective orders); see, e.g., Xarelto, 2016 WL 3923873, at *17 (noting that unnec-
essary information could be redacted before being produced); Fenerjian v. Nong Shim Co., Ltd., 
No. 13-cv-04115-WHO (DMR), 2016 WL 245263, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016) (noting that 
there was a protective order in place in the case stipulating that the data protected by Korea’s data 
privacy law received confidential treatment); Bodner, 202 F.R.D. at 376 (asserting that utilizing a 
protective order mitigates privacy worries). 
 168 SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 17. 
 169 Francesca Bignami, A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 609, 641 (2007); see infra notes 184–192 and accompanying text (explaining policy 
rationales for protecting data privacy). 
 170 See infra notes 176–192 and accompany text. 
 171 See infra notes 176–183 and accompany text. 
 172 See infra notes 184–192 and accompany text. 
 173 See infra notes 176–192 and accompany text. 
 174 See infra notes 176–183 and accompany text. 
 175 See infra notes 184–192 and accompany text. 
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1. International Comity in Discovery: An Argument for Respecting Foreign 
Law and Limiting Court-Ordered Law Breaking 
The central purpose of international comity in the discovery context is 
to facilitate harmony in the global legal system.176 A lack of international 
comity can, therefore, cause undesirable results.177 U.S. court orders to vio-
late the laws of foreign nations have surged astronomically in the last fif-
teen years.178 These cases usually involve discovery requests and thus apply 
the five-factor Aerospatiale test.179 The Aerospatiale comity analysis is 
highly criticized, in part because it strongly depends on subjective evalua-
tions by the court, and its application has resulted in an undeniable “pro-
forum bias” in favor of U.S. interests.180 Not only is it disconcerting that 
U.S. courts are in effect making decisions based on litigants’ nationalities, 
but this pro-forum bias has directly corresponded to a dramatic rise in dis-
covery requests involving court-ordered foreign law violation and, possibly, 
abusive discovery.181 Furthermore, U.S. foreign relations suffer from the 
“legal imperialism” of expansive cross-border discovery orders denounced 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Zambrano, supra note 103, at 160. In the context of discovery, the Hague Convention is 
the best way to achieve international comity. See Stewart, supra note 96 (explaining that the 
Hague Convention is one of the leading judicial assistance treaties in international law today). 
 177 See Geoffrey Sant, Court-Ordered Law Breaking, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 182–83 (2015) 
(explaining the phenomenon of “pro-forum bias” in comity analysis by U.S. courts and the harm it 
causes). 
 178 Id. Before 1987, when Aerospatiale was decided, it was highly uncommon for U.S. courts 
to order litigants to violate foreign law. Id. In 1987, one district court even stated its uncertainty of 
its ability to order the breaking of foreign law. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); id. In the decade after Aerospatiale, a mere two cases applied comity analysis, but there 
have been over fifty cases in the last decade. Sant, supra note 177, at 225–26. 
 179 Sant, supra note 177, at 181–82. 
 180 Id. at 182. Four of the five Aerospatiale factors are subjective, asking judges to assess, for 
example, the importunate of the requested discovery and the risk of subversion of U.S. or foreign 
interests should the discovery not be executed. See supra notes 117–122 and accompanying text 
(describing the five Aerospatiale factors). U.S. judges have not hesitated to make their bias clear, 
citing “the United States’ interests in vindicating the rights of American plaintiffs” as their 
grounds for directing the contravention of foreign law. Sant, supra note 177, at 182. Pro-forum 
bias was a major concern of the four dissenters in Aerospatiale., 482 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., 
Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O’Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Sant, supra note 
177, at 182. Justice Blackmun expressed that pro-forum bias was “likely to creep into the suppos-
edly neutral balancing process” because courts are likely to resort to the rules and procedures of 
their own jurisdiction to which they are accustomed, rather than defer to foreign law. Aerospa-
tiale, 482 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Critics of the Aero-
spatiale test have asserted that it is a “confusing and unworkable standard” and that the balancing 
test offers a mere pretense of reasonableness. Sant, supra note 177, at 189. 
 181 Sant, supra note 177, at 182. Parties in U.S. litigation have adopted the strategy of extract-
ing settlements from the opposing party by purposely requesting unnecessary documents whose 
production would violate foreign law, thereby ensnaring the foreign litigant in a “Catch-22.” Id. 
The fact that U.S. courts have been consistently inclined to order such discovery appears to have 
considerably motivated litigants to request it. Id. 
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by countries like China, France, Germany, and Switzerland.182 It is in the 
best interests of the United States to respect EU data privacy law in the con-
text of discovery orders.183 
2. Data Privacy Is Worthy of Protection by the United States 
In the modern digital age, technological advancements mean that almost 
everything a person does is trackable and recordable, and that information can 
now be used in more ways than ever.184 High-profile data breaches and reve-
lations of government surveillance have brought privacy issues to the fore-
front of public discourse.185 The majority of U.S. citizens are concerned about 
privacy and control over their personal information, and they desire stronger 
protection for personal privacy.186 The U.S. legal approach to data privacy, 
however, is decidedly weaker than that of other countries, and is often criti-
cized as deficient.187 The U.S. Constitution does not provide for the right to 
                                                                                                                           
 182 Zambrano, supra note 103, at 157. The Supreme Court noted that some extra-jurisdictional 
exercises of U.S. law can amount to “legal imperialism” incompatible with the concept of interna-
tional comity. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004); Zambra-
no, supra note 103, at 180. 
 183 See Zambrano, supra note 103, at 197 (asserting that legal disputes involving discovery 
necessarily touch on significant foreign interests like the economy, diplomacy, and international 
legal coordination, thus requiring a strong consideration of international comity). The Aerospa-
tiale balancing test requires consideration of U.S. interests; stable foreign relations have been 
considered an important interest of the United States. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 
762–63 (2014) (finding that comity concerns weighed against applying a U.S. law to a German 
party partly because of potential repercussions for international relations). 
 184 Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 355, 355 (2015). 
 185 See Lee Rainie, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/ [https://
perma.cc/B6B4-YGZK] (observing that the Snowden disclosures of government surveillance 
facilitated public dialogue about privacy in the United States). The Pew Research Center found 
that 64% percent of U.S. adults have been a victim of a major data breach. Kenneth Olmstead & 
Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.pew
internet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/ [https://perma.cc/MPU5-GD8R]. 
 186 See Rainie, supra note 185 (citing Pew Research polls that found that 91% percent of U.S. 
adults feel that the public no longer has control over how businesses process their personal infor-
mation; 74% said that being in control of who has access to their information is “very important”; 
65% said that what kind of information was gathered about them was significant); see also 
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 187 See Brookman, supra note 184, at 357–58 (asserting that the U.S. privacy law regime is 
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privacy, unlike the constitutions of most nations which establish a fundamen-
tal right to privacy.188 
Privacy has always been viewed as an important human right, and 
Americans are highly concerned with privacy issues.189 The United States, 
however, seems to be trending away from stronger protection for personal 
information.190 It is in the best interests of the United States to reverse that 
trend and respect individuals’ right to privacy.191 Even in absence of domes-
tic legal reform, U.S. courts should at least respect that privacy is a funda-
mental right in many foreign countries, including the European Union, and 
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take that right seriously when balancing the factors of international comity 
analysis for the purposes of discovery.192 
CONCLUSION 
Courts should not order foreign litigants to violate data privacy laws 
by which they are governed. Data privacy law protects an important indi-
vidual right, and the Hague Convention provides a viable alternative that 
achieves the goal of obtaining discovery while simultaneously respecting 
foreign law and harmonizing the international legal sphere. The recurring 
justification of courts that EU data privacy law is unlikely to be enforced 
can no longer be argued with certainty. Recent changes in EU data privacy 
law in favor of more stringent rules, the potential for massive sanctions, and 
the increased data privacy law enforcement actions taken by EU member 
states makes EU enforcement a more serious possibility. The principle of 
international comity, furthermore, calls on courts to consider any laws or 
interests of foreign nations that are implicated. Additionally, privacy in and 
of itself is a valuable right that should be protected when practicable to do 
so. U.S. courts should more strongly consider data privacy law, EU inter-
ests, and the hardship placed on foreign parties when making discovery de-
liberations. 
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 192 See supra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining the Aerospatiale balancing test and 
citing a case that respected EU data privacy interests). 
